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ROAD SIGNS AND THE GOALS OF JUSTICE 
Joseph Sanders* 
IDEALS, BELIEFS, A'ITITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PER-
SPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LA w PROBLEM. By Guido Calabresi. 
Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1985. Pp. xv, 208. Cloth, 
$20; paper, $11.95. 
But why not say, instead, that all should study the "goal" directly? 
That assumes that all should be philosophers, and, more important, that 
the best way to get to a point is always to focus directly on it, rather than 
on some road signs that point toward it. This is an assumption that is, I 
think, patently false. 1 
Seventeen years ago, with the publication of his classic book The 
Costs of Accidents, 2 Guido Calabresi helped to usher in a new, sus-
tained interaction between law and economics. A substantial part of 
the new interaction involved substituting economic analyses for tradi-
tional, if vague, legal concepts such as "justice" and "fairness." No-
where has this interaction been more productive than in the area of 
torts. Building upon Learned Hand's analysis in United States v. Car-
roll Towing Co., 3 Calabresi (among others) brought into the main-
stream of tort analysis the economic concepts of the utility-
maximizing individual, efficiency, 4 cheapest cost avoider, transaction 
costs, and cost-benefit analysis. In the process they have greatly en-
riched our understanding of the law of torts5 and the inevitable con-
flicts among its multiple goals. 
The power of this point of view on torts has caused some to view 
the field entirely through the lens of economics. However, every ab-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1969, Ph.D. 1974, 
Northwestern University. - Ed. · 
1. Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
553, 560 (1980). 
2. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
3. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
4. The term "efficiency" has proven to be chameleon-like throughout much of this period. 
Sometimes it has meant Pareto optimality, sometimes a Kaldor-Hicks wealth maximization. In 
this latter meaning it has been open to widespread criticism. See Symposium on Efficiency as a 
Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOF· 
STRA L. REV. 811 (1980). Calabresi agrees with those who hold that wealth maximization per se 
is not a value for society. 
5. See, for example, Coase's famous article on the relationship between liability rules and the 
allocation of risks in the absence of transaction costs, Cease, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. 
& EcoN. 1 (1960), and Shavell's analysis of the relationship between strict liability and negli-
gence, Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
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straction casts some things in shadow while highlighting others. 6 Cal-
abresi has never failed to recognize this fact. He begins the discussion 
of Costs with the following premise concerning the law of torts: 
What, then, are the principal goals of any system of accident law? First, 
it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce the costs of accidents.7 
Costs devotes itself primarily to an economic analysis which has 
reshaped the way coup:s think about accidents. 8 The argument of 
Costs is that an important goal of accident law is to reduce the total 
costs of accidents - both the costs of accidents themselves and acci-
dent-avoidance costs. These include the primary, secondary, and terti-
acy9 costs associated with any scheme we may adopt to deal with 
accidents. The control of primary costs is to be achieved through both 
specific and general deterrence.10 Although justice and fairness are 
given first priority11 as the goals of accident law, they are set aside in 
only two pages, reemerging briefly in Part V, nearly three hundred 
pages later. The content of the idea of justice is not presented. In fact, 
justice is not considered to be a goal of the tort system, but rather a set 
of undefined side constraints based upon other values we hold to be 
important. Collectively, these constitute a veto power which might be 
used to strike down an otherwise efficient system of allocating accident 
costs. In this sense conceptions of justice play a secondary role 
throughout. In Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law, a book based 
upon the Abrams Lectures he gave at Syracuse University in 1982, 
Calabresi makes some amends. Priority is given to questions of jus-
tice. As he sums up near the end of this provocative work: 
Beliefs, ideals, and attitudes are an integral part of our law. Whether 
6. For an insightful discussion of the costs and benefits of the abstractions of economics, see 
Lachman, Knowing and Showing Economics and Law (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 1587 (1984) 
(reviewing A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS (1983)). 
7. G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 24. 
8. See, for instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in Beshada v. Johns-Manville 
Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), which parallels Costs in speaking of the issues 
involved in allowing companies to raise a "state of the art" defense in product liability cases. 
9. Secondary costs are societal costs resulting from accidents. They include such things as 
the costs of rehabilitation and care of the injured. Tertiary costs are the administrative costs of 
an accident-reduction scheme. 
10. The term "specific deterrence" is used to describe collective actions mandating certain 
types of behavior, e.g., stop signs. "General deterrence" describes attempts to allow the market 
to determine the appropriate level of accident-avoidance behavior by allocating accident costs to 
certain individuals or groups, e.g., requiring negligent drivers to pay for the harms their negli-
gence causes. 
11. Both in Costs and in later writings, Calabresi has steadfastly held to the lexical priority of 
justice or fairness concerns over efficiency or distributional considerations. See Calabresi, supra 
note 1. Nevertheless, some have chosen to read Calabresi as arguing for a balancing, or a trade-
off, between justice and efficiency or justice and cost reduction. See Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A 
Response to Professors Ca/abresi and Posner. 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); Horwitz, Law and 
Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980). In part, the disagreement about 
what Calabresi really means is caused by the vague definitions he gives to the ideas of fairness 
and justice. 
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based on current creeds, secularized versions of past faiths, or non-reli-
gious beliefs, they shape what is expected and what seems reasonable in 
the most diverse sections of our law .... 
[M]oralisms, faiths, and beliefs do matter and must be taken into 
account in making law. [pp. 115-16] 
The central arguments in Costs and Ideals are not in opposition. 
The earlier book is frequently cited in the new work; and as his recent 
writings indicate, Calabresi consistently holds out a place for eco-
nomic analysis in torts and other areas of law.12 The arguments are, 
however, in a tension created by the effort to find the proper balance 
between the goals outlined in Costs and other goals of tort law. Fifteen 
years after the publication of the original work, Calabresi is still work-
ing toward a balance of this complex relationship. Ideals is, in part, a 
book about the limits of economic analysis. 
If one reads Ideals with the hope of finding a statement of what the 
proper mix of goals of tort law should be, one will come away disap-
pointed. As the quotation introducing this essay suggests, Calabresi is 
less interested in studying goals directly than in examining road signs 
along the way. These road signs - in the form of insurance rules, tort 
concepts, and the insight which can be gained from the analysis of 
difficult cases involving attitudes, beliefs, and ideals - do provide a 
sense of the boundaries of an economic analysis. 
If, however, one of the strengths of Costs is that it has a relatively 
clear purpose - to examine the types of accident costs and ways to 
reduce them - one of the difficulties with Ideals is that it does not 
have similarly defined goals. The road signs sometimes point in oppo-
site directions. In some passages, Ideals argues that optimal cost allo-
cation should be sacrificed for individual values and beliefs, yet in 
other passages it advocates such sacrifice in order to achieve distribu-
tional social goals. Because of this, the book is in places as much an 
argument with itself as it is with Costs. 
As a way of developing this point I wish to concentrate on one 
basic micro-assumption of economic models: the assumption that peo-
ple will behave rationally to maximize their utility, and thus that law 
- through general and specific sanctions - can cause rational utility-
maximizers to alter their behavior to reduce accidents. By examining 
the various levels at which we may disagree with this relatively modest 
assumption, 13 we can gain further insight into the proper mix of the 
12. Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analy-
sis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA L. REv. 833 (1984). 
13. The premises of Costs are relatively modest and straightforward compared to assump-
tions of other works in the area of law and economics. In particular, the assumption in the work 
of Posner that economic efficiency means wealth maximization has been widely criticized. See 
Calabresi, supra note l; Dworkin, ls Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Markovits, 
Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 811 
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efficiency, distribution, and justice goals of tort law. 
The next section will provide a brief summary of Ideals. Building 
upon the analysis in the book, I will expand upon two ways in which 
we may disagree with this premise of an economic analysis. 14 Wher-
ever possible, I will discuss the data upon which the objections are 
based. I will then discuss the relationship of these objections to each 
other and to an economic analysis. 
I. THE BOOK 
Ideals examines the legal response to beliefs and attitudes. The first 
four chapters explore this issue within the context of accident law. 
Chapter One examines the reasons we give for accepting some acci-
dents while trying to prevent others, and what we should do with re-
spect to those who are injured by our choices. Chapter Two looks at 
how law treats those with social disadvantages or handicaps. Chapter 
Three examines the tort liability of those who are different not because 
of social or physical handicaps, but because of their beliefs. Chapter 
Four examines attitudes and beliefs which are widely held, but are 
disfavored by law.15 Each chapter contains road signs indicating the 
role of attitudes, ideals, and beliefs in the legal system. 
The first road sign is the automobile and our response to the car-
nage it causes. Calabresi discusses the automobile through the meta-
phor of a gift from an evil deity who offers to make life more enjoyable 
for society, at the cost of the sacrifice of the lives of 1000 randomly 
chosen young people. Calabresi asks his first-year torts students if they 
would accept such a gift; and when they say no he asks them how such 
a gift differs from accepting the "gift" of the automobile which kills 
50,000 citizens a year and maims many more. Because the students 
are not anxious to surrender their cars, they strive to find distinctions. 
The distinctions constitute the reasons we give for accepting some ac-
cidents while trying to prevent others. 
Three points raised by the students are relevant because they touch 
upon basic behavioral and moral assumptions of the economic model. 
(1980); Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 939 (1980); 
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 487 (1980). There has also been controversy about the assumptions 
underlying the Coase Theorem, see Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideol· 
ogy in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979), and about the general validity of 
assumptions and procedures in cost-benefit analysis, see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Ent/· 
tlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost· 
Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169 (1984). 
14. As will become obvious, this essay goes beyond Ideals in the critique of economic prem· 
ises. I believe, however, that the seeds of each of these objections can be found in Calabresi's 
book. 
15. Chapter Five uses ideas from the first four chapters to speak to the conflict of values and 
beliefs in the abortion controversy. Because this review focuses on tort law, I will limit my 
discussion to the first four chapters. 
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First, automobiles take "statistical" lives, while the deity wants "real" 
lives. Second, the automobile has saved more lives than it has cost. 
Third, and more fundamentally, cars kill people because of "bad" 
driving. If people behaved like the reasonable person no one would 
die. 
Calabresi answers each of these points. He responds to the statisti-
cal point with the argument that costs are costs, not to be altered by 
our psychological discount functions. We should recognize that there 
is no such thing as a "statistical" life - as pictures of grieving families 
demonstrate. 16 
Positions are reversed with respect to the students' second point. 
They argue that we should accept the automobile because its costs are 
less than its benefits. Calabresi responds with the distributional point 
that while it may be true that cars save more lives than they cost, the 
lives saved are not the same as the lives lost. What of the injuries to 
the victims? 
Victims could, of course, buy insurance against such disasters, but, 
as Calabresi notes, many will fail to do so. Just as outside observers 
may discount statistical lives, actors may underestimate, and thus fail 
to prepare for, the possibility of future injury. Calabresi argues that if 
the issue were put to a vote, most of us would opt for compulsory 
insurance out of a sense of what he calls "self-paternalism." 
Afraid of squandering the money available in short-run pleasures 
rather than long-run security, we wish to compel ourselves to look 
after long-run interests. Absent such compulsion it seems inevitable 
that many will fail to look to long-term interests. Some fail to buy 
insurance, and live (or die) to regret it. In hindsight this might be 
viewed as a failure to conduct one's affairs as would a rational person 
maximizing his utility. How should society and the legal system re-
spond to this psychological reality? 
The solution presented in Ideals is to require compulsory insur-
ance, thus forcing individuals to guard against future catastrophe. 
Calabresi would not allow people to make their own decisions - not 
even those individuals who argue that their decision to choose present 
gratification over provision for future costs is a rational, utility-maxi-
mizing one because they are not risk averse, or because their discount 
function is large. 17 
16. There are at least two aspects to the statistical observation. First, the victim is not identi-
fied. Unknown, he is stripped of individual identifiers which might raise his worth in our eyes 
and thus raise the cost of his death. As outsiders, we discount statistical costs. Second, statistical 
risk implies uncertainty. Although someone will be injured, we might get "lucky" and not be 
hurt. Risk takers undervalue certain statistical risks. We will return to these points below. 
17. Calabresi attempts to justify this result by arguing that insurance is a collective good. In 
one sense, at least, this may be true. As a society we cannot bring ourselves to allow the widow 
and orphan to starve. The noninsurers coerce the rest of us through the emotional blackmail of 
their suffering. We might compel them to insure to avoid their potentially becoming free riders in 
the future. 
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The students' third point, that cars kill people because of "unrea-
sonable" driving, raises two of the book's fundamental questions: 
what constitutes reasonableness, and what are the causes of reasonable 
and unreasonable behavior? Calabresi's first response is similar to his 
response to the "statistical person" argument. We should recognize 
that "reasonableness" is, ultimately, a name we give to the risk-benefit 
trade-off we choose to make. The definition of careless driving, speed-
ing, design defects, and :U!lsafe roads, "in effect represents a decision of 
how much of the evil deity's gift we have chosen to accept, and how 
much we have rejected" (p. 9). Even were perfectibility possible, we 
would be unwilling to pay the cost in terms of safety precautions. 
The students do, however, raise a fundamental point. In many cir-
cumstances people continue to care about what Calabresi has called 
the "moral distribution" of accidents. 18 We wish to place the burden 
of accidents on those who, by their unreasonable behavior, cause the 
accidents. 19 The question remains, what counts as reasonable behav-
ior? Specifically, what of behavior motivated by attitudes, beliefs, or 
values arising from cultural differences or from physical, mental, or 
economic handicap? Calabresi argues that to fail to take account of 
such attitudinal factors in the reasonableness calculus is to burden 
them whenever they entail a risk of harm: "We declare that those who 
hold beliefs should either give them up or pay for them" (p. 19). 
When, if ever, should we treat attitudes and beliefs in this way? 
Calabresi begins the discussion ·of this question by making another 
observation about automobile driving: there are correlations between 
demographic characteristics and accident frequency. He makes the 
reasonable assumption that part of these correlations can be explained 
by attitudinal and value differences among groups of drivers. How 
should we treat members of groups who collectively may have atti-
tudes toward driving that cause them to have a higher incidence of 
accidents?20 
Throughout Ideals Calabresi distinguishes between person as "vie-
18. Calabresi, Policy Goals of the ''Swedish Alternative," 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 657 (1986). 
19. Calabresi believes that many accidents are marginally related to the degree of care taken 
by drivers, and that determining fault is an uncertain and expensive business. Because of this, he 
would prefer some type of strict liability system to allocate the costs of automobile accidents. In 
Ideals, however, he limits discussion to systems of rules that allocate costs based upon actor and 
victim reasonableness. 
20. The common law has traditionally had difficulty with different types of disability. Age 
and physical handicaps are usually taken into account in the reasonableness equation, whereas 
mental handicaps are not. Calabresi asks why the law should treat people with certain demo· 
graphic attributes (race, ethnicity, etc.) the way it treats mental handicaps, rather than the way it 
treats physical handicaps. H.L.A. Hart explains the distinction between physical and mental 
handicaps by saying the law is more willing to entertain limitations based on physical ability than 
limitations of will, partly because it is relatively difficult to prove defects of will. H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY: EssAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 91·92 (1968). By 
analogy the limitations based upon gender or race, at least as they are defined in Ideals, are more 
like defects of will than physical defects. 
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tim" and person as "injurer." When the belief-holder is a victim, Cal-
abresi is sometimes willing to entertain attitudinal and value excuses. 
When the individual is the injurer, however, it is more difficult to jus-
tify the conclusion that an innocent victim should bear the loss of in-
jury because of the injurer's idiosyncratic values. Nevertheless, 
Calabresi argues that we should not burden the young, the old, or 
ethnic groups with bad accident records by requiring them to pay 
higher insurance rates, even though the higher rates might discourage 
such people from driving as much as they do, or from driving higher-
risk automobiles. 
Still, honesty does not require us to conclude that members of this group 
should be excluded from driving, or even limited in their driving by mak-
ing them pay very high insurance rates in order to take part. The 
slaughter - to be blunt - may be worth it in order to include them 
without discrimination! [pp. 34-35] 
Toward this objective, legislatures have attempted to limit some 
rate differences by forbidding insurance companies from setting rates 
based upon gender, age, or ethnicity. Many states spread risk by es-
tablishing uninsured motorist pools, under which insurance companies 
operating in the state must insure those who cannot obtain coverage in 
the private market. Calabresi notes, however, that when insurers are 
forbidden from using age and ethnicity to set rates they may attempt 
to substitute other categories which have the effect of burdening some 
of the same groups.21 He objects to this alternative because it still 
places increased burdens on certain groups. More surprisingly, per-
haps, he also objects to any alternative that sets rates based on an indi-
vidual's past accidents, because it places all in accident-prone 
categories at greater risk of facing the higher insurance rates assigned 
to those who cause accidents.22 
Calabresi's rejection of the individualizing solution follows from 
his assumptions about the distribution and malleability of driving be-
havior. First, groups who have poor driving records and thus will be 
forced to bear this extra cost are also groups which are otherwise rela-
tively disadvantaged. Thus, unequal insurance rates will have undesir-
able distributional consequences. Second, the driving behavior of such 
groups is partly caused by cultural factors, or by traits arising out of 
21. The example he gives is the use of geographically based rate structures, which may act as 
surrogates for ethnic categories. On a similar note, some insurance companies now offer lower 
rates to nonsmokers. Perhaps this is a surrogate for other, accident-related attributes. In both 
cases, however, these alternative categories are not purely subterfuges. For example, the higher 
accident rate of urban areas is not entirely explained by the ethnic composition of these areas. 
22. The premise upon which this point rests can be questioned. In rejecting the individual 
driving record alternative Calabresi says, "But charging drivers on the basis of past accident 
records may instead be of very limited use if the object is not to discriminate against certain 
groups." P. 38. Of course many would say that this is not the objective. Rather, the objective is 
not to discriminate against individuals because of their group membership. Individual insurance 
rates do not do this. 
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past mistreatment of group members.23 These groups have attributes 
that are "undesirable and even dangerous," (p. 42) but society has 
caused these attributes and should collectively bear their costs. Third, 
this type of bad driving behavior cannot easily be altered by law. 
Many individuals will not respond to economic incentives and behave 
as rational utility-maximizers. Any attempt to use law to make them 
behave in this way will only further burden already overburdened 
groups. 
Private insurance companies offer no solution to these problems, 
for they will pursue their economic self-interest. Insurance companies, 
unlike individuals, will behave as rational utility-maximizers, altering 
their rate structures in the face of changing risks. Thus, the best alter-
native is to subsidize24 the insurance rates offered to people who fall 
into high-risk categories because of attributes such as age, gender, or 
ethnicity. 
To summarize, the automobile and insurance road signs indicate 
several ways in which the economic assumption of a society of equally 
rational utility-maximizers is inaccurate. Some actors will fail to 
purchase insurance against injuries, some will fail to drive as safely as 
is called for by the reasonable-person standard, and some will not be 
properly deterred by insurance rates. Moreover, these "failures of ra-
tionality" are not randomly distributed in society. 
Calabresi next turns his attention to attitudes and values that de-
rive from religious and moral beliefs rather than social position. He 
makes the important point that many areas of law are subject to a type 
of constitutional gravitational pull. For example, the free exercise and 
establishment clauses may protect some narrowly held religious beliefs 
by creating a gravitational pull in tort to recognize unusual beliefs as 
23. Unfortunately, Calabresi's discussion in this chapter is not informed by a statement about 
the relative homogeneity and separation of groups. The presentation seems to assume that the 
accident experience of individuals within groups is reasonably homogeneous, and that the differ-
ences between groups are substantial. Perfect homogeneity and complete separation would exist, 
for instance, if all men had two accidents per year and all women had one. If all accidents 
generated the same cost, we would have to charge males twice as much for accident insurance to 
internalize costs to the drivers who caused them, and an equal rate for all men would be fair to 
all men. As groups become less homogeneous, a flat rate within the group becomes Jess and less 
fair. However, as long as the two groups are distinctive, the unfairness (the subsidy of the bad 
drivers by the good) exists only within the group. As the accident experience of members of 
different groups begins to overlap, unfairness emerges between groups. Bad-driving women may 
be charged Jess than good-driving men because the mean accident experience of women is less. 
As the driving experience of the two groups overlaps, however, gender becomes a Jess useful 
predictor, and thus the difference between groups would shrink if insurance company rates were 
driven solely by group accident costs. See K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, 
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 68-75 (1986). 
24. The size of the subsidy is not discussed. Yet unless there is to be but one flat insurance 
rate for all drivers, a problem which is discussed in Costs, "what is a cost of what" must be 
confronted. Is the higher accident rate in cities due only to the attitudes of city drivers, or to the 
nature of city driving (e.g .. crowded freeways)? If the accident rate is due in part to the nature of 
city driving, should those risks be spread to rural drivers? On what distributional criteria? 
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"reasonable," at least when held by victims. He presents four cases, 
partly real and partly hypothetical, which demonstrate this influence. 
The first hypothetical case is loosely based on the facts in Lange v. 
Hoyt. 25 As Calabresi states the facts, a young woman named Minelda 
delays treatment for her shattered pelvis because the treatment con-
flicts with her religious beliefs as a Christian Scientist. 26 As a conse-
quence her injuries are compounded. Should her damages be limited 
to those which she suffers due to the initial injury, or must the injurer 
"take his victim as he finds him," including a victim with religious 
objections to medical treatment? 
The second case, constructed by Calabresi, involves a Catholic 
Minelda who, suffering from a broken pelvis, nevertheless becomes 
pregnant partly because of her religiously based refusal to use artificial 
methods of contraception. She also refuses abortion, and due to the 
earlier injury dies from complications of childbirth. Again, the ques-
tion is whether she or her heirs should be allowed to recover for her 
consequential damages? 
Calabresi calls his third case the Jewish case. In Friedman v. New 
York, 27 Miss Friedman sued the state of New York for its negligence 
in shutting down a ski lift for the evening while she and a young man 
were still on board. The case occurred in the summertime, and thus 
injury from exposure was not likely. The plaintiff, however, jumped 
from the lift and was injured in the fall. What makes the case interest-
ing is her reason for jumping. Miss Friedman said that she believed it 
was a violation of Jewish law for an unmarried woman to be with a 
man after dark in a place where she could not readily be reached. She 
was apparently in error in this belief.28 Nevertheless, she sued for in-
juries due to the fall.29 The New York Court of Claims, sitting with-
out a jury, awarded her damages for her injuries. 
The final case is Troppi v. Scarf. 30 A pharmacist negligently gave 
the plaintiffs tranquilizers instead of birth control pills. A pregnancy 
resulted, and they sued the pharmacist for the cost of bringing up the 
child. The defense was that the couple should have mitigated their 
damages either through abortion or adoption. Plaintiffs responded 
that their beliefs prevented them from pursuing these alternatives. 
25. 114 Conn. 590, 159 A. 575 (1932). 
26. In the actual case the plaintiff was a young girl and it was her mother who was accused of 
delaying or avoiding treatment because of her beliefs, thus exacerbating the daughter's injuries. 
The court allowed an instruction that the jury could consider the mother's conscientiously held 
beliefs in determining whether the plaintiff's behavior was reasonable. 
27. 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967). 
28. The error was not hers but that of the rabbi who instructed her that the rule was an 
absolute prohibition. 
29. Calabresi reports that her "most significant injuries were facial lacerations," p. 51, so the 
distance of the fall must not have been too great. 
30. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). 
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Again the court rejected the defendant's argument, refusing even to let 
the question go to the jury. The pharmacist must take his victims as 
he finds them, including their beliefs. 
If, as Calabresi suggests, we view these cases from the point of view 
of a Learned Hand type of analysis,31 then the decision to jump, and 
the decision to keep the child, may appear more reasonable when the 
beliefs of the plaintiffs are included in the equation. Alternative be-
havior would require a violation of those beliefs with some attached 
cost to the individual. 
As in the case of the evil deity, Calabresi presents these and other 
cases to his first-year torts classes. He reports that they generally disa-
gree with the outcome in the ski lift case, arguing that Miss Friedman 
should not recover for injuries suffered when she jumped, but that the 
Troppis should be compensated for the costs of raising the child.32 
Calabresi says that if this were the rule, then only "banquet" religious 
beliefs which are shared by most citizens are reasonable, whereas other 
beliefs are not. He argues to the contrary - that due to the gravita-
tional pull of the first amendment all religious values should be given 
equal weight. A question remains, however: what weight? 
A substantial part of our difficulty with religious beliefs arises not 
because we reject minority religious views in a cavalier way, but be-
cause we do not know how much weight to give them in an analysis of 
reasonableness. How heavily should a belief in the sin of being alone 
with a person of the opposite sex weigh in solving the reasonableness 
equation? Does it justify jumping off the lift when the ground is but a 
few feet below? Does it make suicide reasonable? Since there is no 
obvious answer, we tend to treat such religious beliefs either as irrele-
vant or as trumps which make otherwise unreasonable behavior 
reasonable. 33 
31. Calabresi states the test as follows: One should compare the costs and benefits of behav-
ior against the costs and benefits of behaving differently, in both cases discounting by the likeli-
hood that the harms or benefits will occur. If, on striking this balance, a behavior is reasonable 
(its benefit-cost ratio is superior to the benefit-cost ratio of behaving differently) then the behavior 
is reasonable even though there is a bad outcome. This is a more complicated test than that 
presented by Hand in Carroll Towing, which only looked at the costs and benefits of a particular 
action, without explicit reference to alternative lines of conduct. The core of both analyses, 
however, is to invite a person to do a type of cost-benefit analysis concerning their own behavior, 
and then to act to maximize the benefit-cost ratio. This is, of course, the rational utility-maxi-
mizing model of behavior assumed by economic analyses. 
32. True to the teaching tradition, upon reading Ideals I immediately plagiarized Calabresi's 
material and asked my first-year torts students about these cases. Unfortunately they did not 
make the same distinction. They agreed that Miss Friedman should not recover, but a majority 
felt that the Troppis also should not recover because their decision to keep the child indicated 
that it had a high value for them. Perhaps there is some aspect of the way I posed the cases 
which accounts for the different response. 
33. The statement in the text is not true in every case. Recall that in the Christian Scientist 
case the court allowed an instruction that the jury could consider the mother's religious beliefs in 
determining whether the delay in seeking treatment was reasonable. 
While Calabresi is never perfectly clear on the question of the weight to be given to values, his 
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The difficulty of assigning a weight to beliefs is perhaps one factor 
causing us to ignore "odd" beliefs when the actor is the injurer rather 
than the victim, and when there is an identifiable victim. Were the 
young lady on the ski lift to negligently jump on top of someone be-
low, causing injury to the person on the ground, her religious convic-
tion would almost certainly not excuse her behavior in a civil suit. 
Calabresi, however, would like to protect Miss Friedman's beliefs 
because, he says, the society has an interest in protecting religious val-
ues. He would create a fund to compensate victims of those who 
would be at fault if their actions were not due to idiosyncratic beliefs. 
In this way, odd and acceptable beliefs would be treated the same. 
This is acceptable because the extra risk these beliefs create will be 
spread so that no set of victims must bear the bulk of the cost. 34 
The final chapter on tort law moves from a discussion of the 
courts' willingness to consider beliefs when determining the reasona-
bleness of behavior, to a discussion of their unwillingness to award 
damages for many harms to beliefs and values themselves. One exam-
ple of this is judicial treatment of the special value individuals attach 
to certain items, such as a watch given by a favorite aunt. In a suit 
against the person who negligently destroyed it, one will not be com-
pensated for the special psychic loss suffered due to the watch's de-
struction. A second example of an injury which often goes 
uncompensated is the emotional injury suffered when one observes 
some horrific effect occasioned by another's negligence, as when wit-
nessing a fatal accident on the highway. Certainly these are both real 
losses, and certainly they are widely experienced, as anyone who has 
lost a favorite keepsake or has had to witness a fatal automobile acci-
dent can report. Why aren't they compensated? 
In the case of a thing of special value Calabresi offers an efficiency 
answer. He argues that knowledge of value is in possession of the vic-
tim, not the injurer. Putting the burden for the special losses attached 
to keepsakes on the injurer would be an inefficient allocation, because 
the injurer would have to act more carefully toward all objects, both 
those with special value and those with only market value. He would 
be too careful with respect to objects with no intrinsic value, and yet 
still not be careful enough toward those objects with special value. The 
owners of things of special intrinsic value are in a better position than 
argument appears to assume that if the harm entailed in violating one's beliefs counts in the 
balance of reasonableness, then the actions of Miss Friedman and the Mineldas are reasonable. 
He does not discuss the possibility that even when this harm is factored into our equation the 
behavior might be unreasonable. Certain values and beliefs appear to act as trumps, short-cir-
cuiting our normal mode of analysis. 
34. Of course, as Calabresi notes, physical injuries, especially serious physical injuries, are 
not amenable to financial compensation. Calabresi's response to this most difficult problem is to 
note that beliefs are not easily monetized either. There is no marketplace where people are ac-
tively trying to sell their beliefs, or buy broken backs. 
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even a negligent injurer to give those things extra protection. This 
argument echoes a discussion earlier in Ideals concerning an injury to 
a violinist who, because of his desire to write a proletarian symphony, 
goes to work in a steel mill and loses his hand in a mishap. Calabresi 
says that in such a circumstance the violinist should only recover the 
value of an ordinary steelworker's hand. In the case of the aunt's 
watch and the violinist's hand, the victims have in some sense assumed 
the risk. Calabresi is willing to apply the cheapest cost avoider analy-
sis of Costs to bar recovery for special damages, because the victim 
could take special precautions. 
Why, however, in the case of the watch or the violinist's hand does 
Calabresi believe it correct to place efficiency concerns (cheapest cost 
avoider) above other considerations? Why not take a similar view to-
ward the insurance rates of young male drivers? Calabresi's answer is 
in two parts. First, he distinguishes among various activities in terms 
of their relative importance for full participation in the society. If, to 
protect special hands or special watches, one must not work in facto-
ries35 or take a favorite timepiece out on the road, this is not an unfair 
burden which removes one from society in general. It is not necessary 
to choose between protecting special property and withdrawing from 
"ordinary" life. 36 One cannot, however, reasonably choose between 
driving a car and protecting valuable hands. Driving is an essential 
part of full participation in the society. Thus, according to Calabresi, 
if the violinist loses his hand in a driving accident the injurer should 
have to pay for the full economic loss. 
With respect to emotional harms suffered from witnessing calami-
ties, Calabresi offers a different, psychological explanation for the 
courts' unwillingness to allow recovery. Recovery for this type of emo-
tional harm might not be allowed because to do so would increase 
actual suffering:37 
35. Or at least not work in factories in order to gain experience for a great proletarian sym-
phony. It is not clear how Calabresi would respond if the reason the violinist is working in the 
mill is to feed his starving family. The musician is presumably still the cheapest cost avoider, yet 
on these facts employment in the mill is a more important part of participation in the society 
than is the right to drive a car. Basing recovery upon the ability of the victim to know and act on 
his limitations is a difficult rule, for there are many things we might do less of in order to limit 
our risks. On the other hand, an "ordinary places" rule refusing recovery where the victim with 
special risk places himself in a setting of extraordinary risk is an arbitrary rule which may often 
fail to capture the ability of the victim to reduce risk. 
36. The perceptive reader may ask, given that the owner of the watch is in the best position 
to know what needs to be done to protect the property, and that providing special protection 
would not exclude the individual from ordinary social life, might not the same argument justify 
the conclusion that Miss Friedman should be held to assume the risk of her special disability 
when she chooses to ride ski lifts with young men? Calabresi implicitly answers this question by 
noting that Miss Friedman was fortunate that the court focused on the reasonableness of her 
jumping, and not on whether, knowing her unique beliefs, she should have boarded the lift at all. 
P. 175 n.280. 
37. Calabresi is ultimately unwilling to say whether such damages should be awarded. 
Other, countervailing arguments might support awarding damages. P. 81. 
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[T]he very fact of focusing on these items, as is necessary in order to 
bring a claim, makes the hurt last. ... 
. . . Most people ... who see ... an accident may feel some emotion, 
but they get over it, and that is the end of it. If, instead, they had a right 
to recover for their emotion, that passing pang would surely not be the 
end of it. ... Again, this is not because of dishonesty ... but because the 
law told them they had been violated, had been hurt, and induced them 
to pay attention to that hurt. [pp. 77-78] 
Throughout this discussion and throughout Ideals, Calabresi rec-
ognizes that legal entitlements themselves alter our perception of costs 
and benefits. Entitlements create value.38 "Law, unlike economics, is 
not concerned only, or even primarily, with reduction of costs, 'given 
tastes.' It is fundamentally concerned with shaping tastes" (p. 84). He 
assumes that the ability of law to shape tastes is greatest where injury 
is solely emotional, unaccompanied by physical harm to self or loved 
one. No data is offered to support this latter argument. For purposes 
of the present discussion, however, what is important is not its truth, 
but rather the fact that Calabresi has used a psychological analysis to 
alter the efficiency conclusions we would draw if we were to use an 
economically rational, utility-maximizing individual as our model. 
II. THE LIMITS OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
Throughout the book, Calabresi is concerned with the insights a 
consideration of ideals, attitudes, and beliefs brings to our understand-
ing of what it is to be a reasonable person. In the process he suggests 
various ways in which an economic definition of reasonableness as 
utility-maximizing behavior inadequately describes individual actions. 
However, the source and nature of our inability to act as utility maxi-
mizers is not always clearly presented. Partly for this reason it is not 
obvious why, on some occasions, Calabresi argues for legal rules that 
protect beliefs and values and at other times for legal rules that ignore 
them or sacrifice them for some other goal. In my judgment this is 
due substantially to the fact that the book is based on a set of partly 
complementary and partly competing psychological and sociological 
critiques of the economic model's micro-assumptions. In what follows 
I will review the general outline of these critiques and indicate how 
they relate to one another and to the micro-assumptions of the eco-
nomic model. 
A. Psychological Critique 
The first and most direct critique is psychological.39 The nature of 
the psychological critique is exemplified by a body of research con-
38. For a similar point with respect to the effect of property rules, see Kelman, supra note 13. 
39. Needless to say, there may be several additional critiques of the economic model. In this 
review I do not presume to survey the whole range of possible critiques. 
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ducted by Kahneman and Tversky which indicates that in certain situ-
ations individuals usually fail to make utility-maximizing decisions.40 
In one important article they call their theory of decisionmaking 
"prospect theory."41 A central conclusion of prospect theory is that 
individuals usually fail to assign a linear value function to risky 
choices. Measured by probability functions, they overweight sure 
things and improbable events. For example, a large majority of people 
would choose a sure $800 rather than an 85% chance at $1000. In 
such situations individuals tend to be risk averse.42 Note that in this 
respect prospect theory does not argue that people are not maximizing 
utility, but rather that utility is not simply a function of wealth. 
Kahneman and Tversky explain these results by arguing that individu-
als' subjective values are measured in terms of gains and losses rather 
than in terms of total wealth. Subjective value is a function of the 
relative size of a gain. The utility difference between $200 and $100 is 
greater than the utility difference between $1200 and $1100. 
The same is true of losses. The difference in subjective value be-
tween a loss of $200 and a loss of $100 is greater than the difference in 
subjective value between a loss of $1200 and a loss of $1100. The 
value function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the 
domain of losses. 
Finally, individuals tend to be loss averse; the subjective value 
function is steeper for losses than for gains. Most people are reluctant 
to bet on a fair coin for equal stakes. A loss of $100 is subjectively 
greater than a gain of $100. Because the subjective value function is 
convex in the domain of losses, individuals tend to be risk-seeking 
when confronting losses. Most individuals forced to choose between an 
85% chance of losing $1000 and a sure loss of $800 prefer the gamble 
over the sure loss. Individuals will make similar choices with respect 
to the loss of life. 43 
The fact that value functions are not linear leads to a second and 
more fundamental way in which individual decisions do not conform 
40. See especially Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 41 EcoNOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]; Tver· 
sky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 
(1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice]; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER· 
TAIN1Y: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slavic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); Kahneman 
& Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984) [hereinafter 
Kahneman & Tversky, Choices]; Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 
(R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds. 1987). 
41. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 40. 
42. In such situations we can understand individual preferences by positing a diminishing 
utility of money. The subjective value of $800 is more than 80% of the value of $1000. As 
discussed in the text, however, the valuation of losses is less easily understood in these terms. 
43. Fischhoff, Predicting Frames, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY 
& COGNITION 103 (1983). 
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to the model of a utility maximizer. Choices in situations of risk are 
affected by the way the choice is "framed," either as a gain or a loss 
relative to the status quo. Individuals fail to obey the invariance re-
quirement of rational choice, that the preference order between pros-
pects should not depend upon the manner in which they are described. 
Kahneman and Tversky provide the results of the following experi-
ment44 to exhibit this tendency. 
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an 
unusual disease, which is expected to kill six hundred people. Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. As-
sume that the exact scientific estimates of their consequences are as 
follows:45 
If Program A is adopted, two hundred people will be saved. If Program 
B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that six hundred people will 
be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
When presented with this pair of choices, framed so as to create a 
choice between "gains," people are risk averse and choose the sure 
thing (72%) over the gamble (28%). Next, the researchers reframed 
the choice so that it is between losses. 
If Program C is adopted, four hundred people will die. If Program D is 
adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that six hundred people will die. 
Given this pair of choices subjects are risk-seeking, choosing the gam-
ble (78%) over the sure thing (22%). The pair of choices indicates a 
failure of invariance. 
A similar failure may occur in individual choices which tum on 
whether we frame some disadvantage of a decision as a loss or a cost. 
Kahneman and Tversky invite us to consider the choice between a 
sure loss of $50 and a 25% chance to lose $200. Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein report that 80% of the subjects in one experiment chose, 
as we would expect, the gamble over the sure loss. However, only 
35% of a group of subjects refused to pay $50 for insurance against a 
25% risk of losing $200.46 Kahneman and Tversky report: 
The failure of invariance is both pervasive and robust. It is as common 
among sophisticated respondents as among naive ones, and it is not elim-
inated even when the same respondents answer both questions within a 
44. N = 152. 
45. The example is from Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 40, at 453. 
46. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Response Mode, Framing, and Information-Processing 
Effects in Risk Assessment, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BEHA v-
IORAL SCIENCE: QUESTION FRAMING AND REsPONSE CONSISTENCY 21 (R. Hogarth ed. 1982); 
see also Schoemaker & Kunreuther, An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & 
INS. 603 (1979); Hershey & Schoemaker, Risk Taking and Problem Contest in the Domain of 
Losses: An Expected-Utility Analysis, 47 J. RISK & INS. 111 (1980); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichten-
stein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCES 241 (R. Noll ed. 1985). 
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few minutes. Respondents confronted with their conflicting answers are 
typically puzzled. Even after rereading the problems, they still wish to 
be risk averse in the "lives saved" version; they wish to be risk seeking in 
the "lives lost" version; and they also wish to obey invariance and give 
consistent answers in the two versions. In their stubborn appeal, fram-
ing effects resemble perceptual illusions more than computational errors. 
The moral of these results is disturbing: Invariance is normatively 
essential, intuitively compelling, and psychologically unfeasible.47 
As the quotation suggests, Kahneman and Tversky are disturbed 
by the results of these experiments. Because failure of invariance in 
judgment is in substantial part due to a focus on gains or losses, 
Kahneman and Tversky propose various methods of rephrasing 
problems which will cause the individual to make decisions that meet 
the invariance requirement. One method is to force all choices into 
choices between states of wealth (total assets) rather than gains and 
losses. This is relatively easy to do when the choice can be monetized. 
If this is not possible, as, for example, when we are considering human 
lives, an alternative method is to evaluate options in terms of their 
actuarial consequences. 
In Chapter One of Ideals, Calabresi uses arguments based upon 
actuarial and total wealth considerations to attack student distinctions 
between the gift of the evil deity and deaths due to automobiles. When 
the students suggest that the difference between the evil deity gift and 
cars is that cars take statistical lives rather than real lives, they seem to 
be searching for a solution that will trade a sure number of deaths for 
some gamble on an unknown number of road fatalities.48 When they 
argue that "bad drivers" cause accidents, and that if people behaved 
"reasonably" many fewer would die, they seek to frame the issue in 
terms of the number of lives that could be saved if only people would 
drive safely. Calabresi relentlessly forces them (and the reader) to fo-
cus on the actuarial consequences of their decision, rather than on the 
gains or losses of life, or upon probabilistic versus certain outcomes. In 
this chapter he prefers basing decisions on the model of utility max-
imization rather than the decision rules of prospect theory. 
In most of Ideals, however, Calabresi refuses to adopt this position 
when he is considering the plight of specific individuals. He does not 
force plaintiffs to consider from such a perspective the decisions to 
jump from a ski lift or to have an abortion. Nor, at least in the case 
47. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 40, at 343-44. Along with invariance, another 
principle of rational choice is dominance. If choice A is at least as good as choice B in every 
respect, and better thanB in at least one respect, thenA should be preferred to (should dominate) 
B. Most individuals also violate the principle of dominance when presented with certain pairs of 
choices. Id. at 344. 
48. For a discussion of the different reactions people have to endangered known individuals 
versus endangered statistical lives, see c. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF 
PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 155-57 (1970). 
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where the individual is the victim, does he accept a legal standard that 
requires the trier of fact to judge such behavior from this point of 
view. Why? 
In part this is because, as Kahneman and Tversky note, state-of-
wealth and actuarial perspectives are inadequate for outcomes which 
lack an objective metric.49 Thus there is no actuarial way to frame the 
choice between jumping from a ski lift and being alone with a man 
after dark. The lack of a metric is in part due to the fact that there is 
no clear frame of reference within which to assess the costs and bene-
fits of the alternatives. The nature of this difficulty is captured with 
the idea of mental accounting. so 
A minimal account is one in which the only mental accounting is 
with respect to the difference between two options. One disregards 
any features the options might share. A topical account judges the 
consequences of possible choices based on the context within which 
the decision arises. Topical accounting occurs when we find we will 
drive to a different shopping mall to save five dollars on the purchase 
of a fifteen-dollar pocket calculator, but will not drive the same dis-
tance to save five dollars on a $1500 stereo system. By a minimal 
accounting one would look only to the five-dollar difference in each 
case. Finally, there is comprehensive accounting in which the relative 
advantage between two options is calculated within some larger con-
text, such as monthly expenses.51 
The problem of mental accounting is particularly difficult when 
one attempts to deflect responsibility not by an excuse but by a justifi-
cation based upon an appeal to moral, political, or religious values. 52 
The "cost" to an individual of some line of conduct may spill over far 
beyond the immediate transaction. To assess the utility of conduct 
requires a comprehensive accounting. 
Special difficulties arise when others are required to assess the rea-
sonableness of "odd" beliefs as a justification for behavior. As Cala-
bresi notes, from the very beginnings of the tort of negligence there has 
been a tension between a subjective view and an objective view of rea-
sonable behavior. In judging the worth of values the tension is height-
ened. Since there is no unambiguous way to assign a utility to a value, 
49. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 40, at 344. 
50. See id. at 346-48; see also Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. 
EcON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39 (1980). 
51. Kahneman and Tversky note that in accordance with prospect theory, most people use 
topical accounting when reaching decisions. Gains and losses are judged in relative rather than 
absolute terms. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 40, at 347. 
52. For a discussion of the distinction between justifications and excuses, see Scott & Lyman, 
Accounts, 33 AM. Soc. REv. 46, 47 (1968). For a useful taxonomy of excuses and justifications, 
see G. SEMIN & A. MANSTEAD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CONDUCT: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1983). 
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there is a risk that the judge will apply his or her own values to the 
case. 
This occurs when Calabresi's first-year tort students are more sym-
pathetic to the couple who refuse an abortion than to Miss Friedman 
when she jumps from the lift. Studies in the attribution theory tradi-
tion in social psychology lend support for Calabresi's concern that we 
are more likely to judge those similar to us according to an attribution 
process that considers their unique situation and the meaning of their 
action to them. 53 When judging individuals who are different from us, 
on the other hand, we are more likely to judge their activities from the 
perspective of an average person, and to rely upon a topical or even a 
minimal accounting which disregards the importance of a set of values 
in the individual's life. This is especially likely if we have as part of 
our purpose an attempt to influence the behavior of others in the fu-
ture. 54 If one does not agree with the worth of a belief, a failure to 
recognize it is a way to discourage future action based on the belief. 
In summary, a utility-maximization model for assessing the rea-
sonableness of a line of conduct offers little guidance when the conclu-
sion rests on an implicit choice between a typified, topical accounting 
and an individualized, comprehensive accounting. Confronted with 
this limitation there are several ways we might proceed. First, we 
could continue with a minimal or topical accounting. Calabresi rejects 
this option because it is a recipe for decisions based upon commonly 
held, majoritarian values. This is particularly dangerous because, as 
we know from Kahneman and Tversky's results, individuals fre-
quently behave irrationally (from the perspective of a linear utility-
maximization model), at least in the narrow sense that they are risk-
seekers. For example, Miss Friedman was confronted with the choice 
between certain sin if she stayed on the lift and some probability (less 
than 100%) of injury if she jumped; prospect theory suggests that the 
choice to jump was probably overweighted. Of course she could re-
spond that this was still a rational choice because the expected loss of 
staying on the lift was greater than the expected loss of jumping. But 
because there is no metric, nor even an agreed-upon level of account-
ing by which we might judge such a question, we cannot assess the 
truth of such an assertion except by her behavior. The corrupting in-
fluence of Kahneman and Tversky is precisely that their work suggests 
that behavior in risky situations often is not a good measure of the 
preference of . an economically rational, utility-maximizing 
53. See, e.g., Jones & Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Cause 
of Behavior, in ATIRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 79 (E. Jones, D. Ka· 
nouse, H. Kelley, R. Nisbett, S. Valins & B. Weiner eds. 1972). 
54. See Schmitt, The Invocation of Moral Obligation, 21 SOCIOMETRY 299 (1964); Kelley, 
Attribution in Social Interaction, in ATIRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR, 
supra note 53, at 1. 
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individual. 55 
A second option is to conduct a deep analysis of the meaning and 
circumstances implied by a comprehensive accounting scheme. This 
alternative, too, is rejected. Calabresi never suggests that the courts 
should attempt a comprehensive accounting of the utility of violating a 
belief versus the utility of injury. To do so might lead to the conclu-
sion that the reasonable thing to do is to abandon the belief and act to 
avoid injury or to mitigate damages. While Calabresi never explicitly 
states why this course would be unwise, reasons quickly come to mind. 
Consistency in such judgments seems unlikely, leading to a perception 
of unfairness across cases. Moreover, the tertiary costs of such a deci-
sion-making process would be substantial. 
The third option is to make an a priori decision as to whether the 
justification is to be honored, and if so, allow it to trump, at least in 
cases where the belief-holder is the victim. Calabresi appears to opt 
for an absolute solution. Either a belief is to be recognized and 
honored or it is not. The decision as to whether to honor a belief is to 
be made on the basis of other considerations, which Calabresi purports 
to derive from the Constitution, e.g., the establishment clause of the 
first amendment. In the domain of justifications based on beliefs, a 
cost-benefit utility-maximization analysis is inappropriate. 
B. Sociological Critique 
If the difficulties we confront in applying an economic model to 
religious beliefs are primarily psychological, the difficulties presented 
by the disadvantaged are primarily sociological. Like the rest of us, 
the disadvantaged may make risky decisions according to the hypothe-
ses of prospect theory, and if their actions are adjudicated by strang-
ers, their value-based justifications may be judged within the context 
of a minimal account which gives little weight to values. The disad-
vantaged, however, suffer from an additional handicap: they do not 
have the same choices that others do. This is the heart of the sociolog-
ical critique. Insofar as an economic analysis is premised upon equal 
human autonomy and ability, it misrepresents the reality of individual 
choice, and thus may misinterpret the meaning of an exchange. The 
sociological critique is aimed at the equality part of the assumption 
that people are equally rational utility-maximizers. 
The problem is most frequently discussed in terms of wealth and 
the effect of the choice of money as a metric of comparison. If two 
people are given an opportunity to purchase apples in a market and 
one offers more than another, we cannot say that the utility of the 
apple is higher for the first person. This conclusion is contingent upon 
55. If utility maximization is the measure of reasonable behavior, jumping was unreasonable. 
If, however, reasonableness is measured by typical behavior, Miss Friedman's choice might be 
considered reasonable since most people would overweight the risky choice in such a situation. 
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the choice of metric. A metric which does not account for initial posi-
tion sends an ambiguous signal. If person one - who has three times 
the assets of person two - offers twice as much money, does the out-
come reflect the different utility of apples, or does it reflect the differ-
ences in starting position? Presumably it reflects some of both. A 
metric which takes account of starting position - for instance, one 
which measures utility on the basis of the relative proportion of total 
wealth two people would be willing to pay for an item - would be a 
better measure of underlying utility in the sense that it would be less 
influenced by initial starting position. 56 Thus the use of a metric such 
as money introduces one type of sociological effect. People with less 
money confront constrained choices, at least in those circumstances 
when the choice involves more than a trivial cost. Wealth effects per 
se, however, are only part of the sociological critique. 
Consider the situation where a single person is given a choice be-
tween an apple and an orange. If the individual chooses an apple, can 
we say that the apple maximizes utility? Mark Kelman argues that 
the neoclassical utilitarian answer is a tautological yes. One is better 
off when one gets what one chooses because one chooses what makes 
one better off. 57 Certainly, however, this is not always the case. 58 Even 
when people know what is best they may not act on it. For example, 
some choices are "choices of unwanted habituation," unwelcome even 
as they are made. Such a state of affairs describes the alcoholic's 
choice to drink. To say the choice must represent a preference for 
intoxication over sobriety in the same sense that the choice of an apple 
represents a preference against citrus, or even to say that the choice of 
an alcoholic is the same as the choice of most people to drink or not, is 
to disregard the differences among the sorts and conditions of men. 
In the present context, an even more important restriction on 
choice is the fact that actions are influenced by attitudes and values 
that are in part the product of accommodations to background condi-
tions. 59 Driving behavior may be influenced by attitudes that are in 
turn a product of one's social position. 
When we say attitudes prevent someone from driving more safely 
56. Less, but not totally uninfluenced since we should expect that an individual's tastes 
change with changes in wealth. Calabresi, among others, makes this point. Calabresi, supra note 
1, at 555. This is one explanation for the so-called Scitovsky paradox in cost-benefit analyzes, 
whereby a change from position one to position two is efficient (benefits outweigh costs), and a 
change back from position two to position one is also efficient. See Markovits, supra note 13, at 
820 n.12. Of course, if all actual exchanges - rather than the measurement of utility - were to 
occur on the basis of percentage of wealth, then there would be no wealth effects, for there would 
be no effective differences in wealth. 
57. Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769, 778. 
58. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 908, cites an early Calabresi article for this point of view: 
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 10 YALE L.J. 499, 502 
(1961). 
59. Kelman, supra note 57, at 772. 
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we do not mean, presumably, that the individual does not have the 
ability to drive better (as perhaps we may say of some new drivers). 
Nor is this inability a matter of capacity to learn. The person could 
learn to drive better by changing his attitudes about driving (as per-
haps some old people could not). This is not to say that attitudes may 
not act as impediments to safer driving. Young male drivers may 
drive relatively badly because of attitudes toward cars, driving, and 
their sense of self. Calabresi thinks the same might be said of some 
other drivers. The circumstances of their lives compel them to certain 
points of view which are not easily changed absent a change in their 
circumstances. 
At times these social differences may alter psychological percep-
tions of risk, which in tum influence risk-taking behavior. Consider, 
for example, the decision to wear seat belts. If the individual chooses 
not to wear a belt, what does this choice tell us about the individual? 
Some insight into this question may be gained by considering the re-
sults of an experiment by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein. 60 They 
begin by noting that a fatal auto accident occurs only once in every 3.5 
million person-trips, and a disabling injury only once in every 100,000 
person-trips. Thus, to fasten one's seat belt may seem to be an unnec-
essary precaution. But from the point of view of a lifetime (fifty years) 
of driving (approximately 40,000 trips), the odds of being killed are 
approximately one percent, and those of a disabling injury exceed one 
in three. The study showed that people asked to consider this lifetime 
perspective were more favorably disposed toward seat belts than those 
asked to consider the trip-by-trip perspective. People who do not at-
tend to long-run costs are less likely to wear seat belts. However, the 
probability that an individual will adopt the long view may not be 
randomly distributed in the society. Younger and poorer members of 
the society may be less likely to take a longer view. When individuals 
take a shorter view the probability of catastrophic injury becomes very 
small, and prospect theory argues that these risks will then be underes-
timated from the point of view of utility maximization. When Cala-
bresi argues that certain groups cannot act in the aggregate according 
to the standards of a reasonable person, he is offering a sociological 
critique of policies or decisions based upon a utility-maximizing model 
(p. 41). 
Here, unlike the situation with respect to religious values, however, 
Calabresi, like the common law, 61 is generally unwilling to alter the 
60. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Accident Probabilities and Seat Belt Usage: A Psycho-
logical Perspective, 10 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 281 (1978). See generally JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 40. 
61. "Where cost causing behavior derives from attitudes linked to ethnic or racial status it is 
generally deemed to be unreasonable at common law, whether in victims or in injurers." P. 43. 
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standards of reasonable behavior for members of these groups. 62 
There are two reasons for this. First, an individual's inability to act 
reasonably due to attitudes or values associated with social position is 
not the type of fundamental impossibility that places behavior beyond 
the influence of the law. Second, honoring attitudinal and value ex-
cuses associated with social position implies a comprehensive account-
ing. A comprehensive accounting, which adopts a longer view, seems 
misplaced when the attitudes or values are not themselves particularly 
worthy of protection or encouragement. From the point of view of a 
neutral observer, some of these attitudes induce irrational preferences 
in the sense that the preferences would not persist if the individual had 
better information or reasoning. 63 As Calabresi notes when discussing 
damages for emotional distress, recognizing such attitudinal excuses 
would presumably encourage these preferences when in fact the soci-
ety would prefer to frustrate them. 
Since structurally generated attitudes or values are not the type of 
justification we are generally willing to recognize as an excuse for neg-
ligence, and since Calabresi, nevertheless, believes that the attitudes 
and values that drive this behavior are not easily altered, he is opposed 
to variations in insurance rate structures which reflect differences in 
individual or group safety records. 64 Calabresi trades potential gen-
eral deterrence, and the reduction of accidents and accident-avoidance 
costs which might accompany it, for a distributional objective which 
reflects his hypotheses concerning the unequal distribution of utility-
maximizing driving behavior. 
This solution leaves us with the question of who should enjoy the 
subsidy. One answer might be all individuals who hold attitudes and 
values, produced by their position in the social structure, which cause 
their behavior to fall below the reasonable-person standard. The atti-
tudes and values of the "poor little rich kid" who drives badly are as 
worthy of protection as are those of the poor kid. Would we, however, 
62. Even when the actor is the victim, Calabresi does not suggest that we consider the actor's 
values in deciding the reasonableness of his behavior. 
63. See G.P. PENZ, CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN INTERESTS 63-66 (1986). 
64. Although Calabresi's primary reason for rejecting rate structures based upon individual 
driving records reflects his belief that in some sociological sense safer driving is beyond the indi-
vidual's control, he apparently objects to this type of categorization also because it is not a good 
predictor of future accidents. The more efficient predictors are precisely those which Calabresi 
objects to on what K. ABRAHAM, supra note 23, calls causality-control grounds. For example, 
Abraham notes that while all variables in use explained only 22% of accident loss in a 1979 
study, the driver's sex, which was the single most efficient variable, accounted for over one-third 
of the explainable variance. It is unlikely any other substitute variable will do as well. Of course, 
the very fact that some of the objectionable variables are relatively efficient means that if they are 
eliminated there will be a substantial change in the rate structure, and thus a substantial shift in 
the distribution of the burden of insurance. Abraham reports that the same study concluded 
that, if sex were eliminated as a variable, young female drivers' insurance rates would rise 26% 
while male rates would drop 6%. (The difference is due to the fact that at the time of the study 
76% of all youthful drivers were male.) 
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choose to equalize insurance premiums if the result were that the poor 
would subsidize the well-to-do for their careless driving behavior? 
That many of us would answer "no" suggests that the sociological 
critique leads us in a different direction than does the psychological 
critique. The nature of these differing directions may be viewed from 
the perspective of philosophical objections to utilitarianism. 
C. Philosophical Objections 
Calabresi raises this issue with the following example. When 
speaking of the evil deity's gift to the society he argues: 
Finally, we do care a great deal about who wins and who loses as a 
result of our acceptances and our rejections of the evil deity's offers. A 
great increase in life-years for the very rich, achieved at the cost of bru-
talizing and shortening the lives of the very poor, is not a gain - even if 
the total of additional life-years comes out "in the black." [p. 11] 
An economic model which follows Bentham's utilitarian dictum, 
"everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,"65 might jus-
tify the above trade precisely because it treats each individual's values 
as equal, and adopts as its premise the formal equality of individuals as 
rational utility-maximizers. 66 Utilitarian equality is individual 
equality. 
This outcome is not acceptable to Calabresi. He, like many, does 
not approve of all outcomes that are justified by a utilitarian principle 
of the greatest good for the greatest number. What is unclear in Cala-
bresi's analysis is exactly why this outcome is unacceptable. Is the 
outcome (brutalized and shortened lives for some) objectionable be-
cause it is the poor whose lives are brutalized and shortened? Would 
the objection disappear if the positions of rich and poor were reversed 
in this hypothetical? Is it the distributional consequences or the inter-
personal trade-offs per se which are unacceptable? These two funda-
mental objections to the equal utility-maximizing model spring from 
the sociological and psychological critiques, and they in tum may con-
flict with each other. 
The philosophical objection which finds its roots in the sociological 
critique focuses upon the utilitarian model's distributional assump-
tions. It attacks the premise that there is equal freedom of choice for 
any decision rule. By attacking the micro-assumption of equal utility 
maximization, the critique also casts doubt on the argument that ex-
isting distributions are the result of a set of free exchanges in society 
65. J.S. MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOV-
ERNMENT 77 (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed. 1951) (quoting J. Bentham). 
66. It is, however, easy to straw-man utilitarianism here. The fundamental assumption that 
marginal utility declines with increasing income would constrain the likelihood that the transac-
tion in the text would be approved. Of course, if the gain to the advantaged were sufficiently 
large, it would be justified. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 264 
(1980). 
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and, therefore, are prima facie entitled to the presumption that they 
are efficient. 
Many distributional arguments go further and call for some vision 
of social justice which would require reallocation of resources even if 
the reallocation is not efficient in the wealth-maximizing sense. 67 As 
such they do not object to utilitarianism's concern with the general 
welfare, or its willingness to sacrifice the welfare of some in the effort 
to achieve this goal. Rather, they object to the way individuals are 
counted in the calculus. They reject the individual equality of the eco-
nomic model, and in its place substitute the idea of equality in a com-
munity. People are not to count as one in calculating just 
distributions. From this point of view, what is wrong with the ex-
change in Calabresi's example is that the disadvantaged are sacrificed 
for the common good. 6s 
The second philosophical objection to utilitarianism is from the 
"rights" tradition which argues that the individual's status and posi-
tion are not to be sacrificed for any social good, whether it be in-
creased efficiency, aggregate social wealth, or some other vision of the 
just society. If the distributional objective finds its roots in the social 
critique, the rights-based objection more clearly finds roots in the psy-
chological critique. Especially when we deal with things like values 
for which there is neither an agreed-upon metric nor an agreed-upon 
level of accounting (minimal, topical, or comprehensive), any utility-
maximizing calculation is arbitrary. Because judges and juries may 
apply standards that fail to reflect the same value considerations that 
motivated the actor, individuals need protection against reallocative 
decisions. The individual has rights which trump both efficiency and 
distributional goals. 69 From this perspective, what is wrong in Cala-
bresi's example is not that the disadvantaged are sacrificed, but that 
anyone is sacrificed to the general good. 
In its policy suggestions, Ideals is a complex and sometimes con-
fusing mix of both rights-based and distributional-based objections to 
the utilitarian, economic efficiency model. In a rather remarkable pas-
sage near the end of the book, Calabresi creates a complex and pur-
67. John Rawls' difference principle is a call for such a rule, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF Jus-
TICE (1971), as is Ackerman's call for undominated equality, B. ACKERMAN, supra note 66, at 
28. 
68. Cost-benefit analyses can incorporate distributional considerations into their analyses by 
adding such things as a welfare function, to be inserted into each equation when assessing the 
gains and losses of various reallocations. M. THOMPSON, BENEFIT-Cosr ANALYSIS FOR PRO-
GRAM EVALUATION (1980). 
69. See generally Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986). The 
rights tradition includes both contract and libertarian theorists such as John Rawls, Robert 
Nozick, Richard Epstein, and Ronald Dworkin. Note that Rawls, like many others, is on both 
sides of this argument: unwilling to allow utilitarian notions to determine the distributional 
question, and also unwilling to allow any type of distributional objective to trump all individual 
rights. 
April-May 1987] Road Signs and Justice Goals 1321 
posefully unreal hypothetical of some individuals who would have to 
go through life wearing a lead tunic to protect neonates from a certain 
sexually transmitted disease. Calabresi argues that if the carriers of 
the disease came from a recognizable ethnic group, laws requiring 
them to wear tunics would be invalid, whereas such a law would 
"surely be upheld" if the individuals who carried this disease "came 
from all groups in society, or only from groups which traditionally 
dominated the society and which suffered no invidious discrimina-
tion. "70 In this passage the individual equality of utilitarianism is re-
jected for some type of calculus which weighs the effect of each 
decision on community inequality. If every group is affected equally, 
then the lead-vested individuals may be sacrificed for the common 
good because their impediment will have no effect on group inequali-
ties; and if the disease is concentrated among elites, it is permissible to 
add an extra burden to their lives, perhaps on the basis of a calculus 
which weighs comparative advantage in the community and allows 
burdens which create greater aggregate equality. 
What is striking about this example is that it is contrary to what I 
perceive to be the primary thrust of the book, which is, ultimately, a 
rights-based objection to utilitarian-based efficiency analysis. Miss 
Friedman should recover for injuries sustained in jumping from the ski 
lift because her ideals and beliefs are part of that bundle of "rights"71 
not to be trampled for some larger social virtue, including the virtues 
of having a single standard of reasonable behavior and a common core 
of cultural and religious values. 72 
The tension indicated by the lead vest example exists because of 
Calabresi's focus upon the road signs of human ideals, beliefs, and val-
ues and their complex position in society and the legal system. Ideals 
70. P. 108. By this line of analysis Calabresi tries to explain the Supreme Court opinion 
upholding compulsory draft registration laws which apply solely to men. Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57 (1981). Men are not a discriminated-against group, and thus the law does not violate 
the equal protection clause. One might ask, however, whether it is reasonable to say that seven-
teen-year-old boys are a privileged group in our society. 
71. In this regard Calabresi's position is perhaps closest to that of Dworkin, whose central 
idea is that each individual is entitled to equal dignity and respect from others and the govern-
ment. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977). A "rights" theory based upon 
the right to equal dignity and respect must perforce give great weight to an individual's values 
and beliefs, and to the actions the individual takes in furtherance of those values and beliefs. 
72. Through much of the book Calabresi attempts to downplay the importance of this con-
flict by premising his argument on the assumption that cultural diversity is almost always a social 
(distributional) good. Of course the strongest expression of this position is with respect to reli-
gious values where the societal goal is no established religions. When we move beyond religious 
values the truth of this assertion is less obvious. There are, needless to say, those who question 
the value of unlimited cultural pluralism and ethnic identification. See Hirschman, America's 
Melting Pot Reconsidered, 9 ANN. REV. Soc. 397 (1983); s. STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: 
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN AMERICA (1981); R. ALBA, ITALIAN AMERICANS: INTO THE 
TWILIGHT OF ETHNICITY (1985). Alba, for example, argues, "Ethnicity ..• does not stand on its 
own but stands because it is draped over the skeletal structure of inequality." Id. at 12. 
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and beliefs, more than most other aspects of our lives and personali-
ties, indicate the limits of a cost-benefit, utilitarian analysis. 
Examining attitudes and beliefs causes us to focus upon the irra-
tional or at least indeterminate nature of much of our behavior. Ab-
sent (indeed, even considering) her religious beliefs, Miss Friedman's 
behavior would be called irrational by some. The same may be said of 
the driving behavior Calabresi hypothetically attributes to some 
groups. Yet when beliefs are considered, the calculation - if not the 
idea - of the cost-benefit equation becomes indeterminate. Thus the 
focus on attitudes and beliefs forces us to consider the ways in which 
individuals are unable to engage in utility-maximizing behavior, as 
well as the indeterminacy of any utility-maximizing equation. 
Not only does the focus on attitudes and beliefs highlight the limi-
tations of an economic analysis of legal rules, it also reveals our uncer-
tainty as to how to proceed in the face of these challenges. Since the 
values and beliefs are important premises in any efficiency calculus, to 
accept majoritarian, middle-class values as a given is to insure the per-
petuation of existing definitions of rational utility-maximization. To 
do so is to fail to respond to the sociological critique of utilitarianism. 
On the other hand, ideals, beliefs, and attitudes are not 
automobiles, or even broken legs as a result of automobile accidents. 
Within each individual they are incorporeal and fragile. A person's 
beliefs are, as Calabresi wisely notes, all too easily altered by legal 
rules. When behavior which was illegal becomes legal, or that which 
was legal becomes illegal, individual judgments, attitudes, and beliefs 
about the moral worth of the behavior or the worth of the values un-
derlying it are changed (p. 82). Because attitudes and beliefs have 
value in themselves, and because they are easily destroyed, they de-
serve protection beyond that afforded by an economic analysis based 
upon a minimal accounting. A focus on beliefs forces us to ask what 
aspects of an autonomous individual require protection from consider-
ations of utility maximization. 73 
Unfortunately, while Ideals recognizes the limitations of an eco-
nomic efficiency analysis, it does not provide a consistent vision of ex-
actly how justice considerations should interact with and constrain 
efficiency and distributional concerns. The book does contain pieces 
of such a vision. Justice constraints may be found in the gravitational 
pull of constitutional provisions. Cultural pluralism is an important 
goal in American society. Activities which are necessary for full par-
ticipation in society deserve special protection. To move beyond these 
hints about the nature of the justice-veto, Calabresi must, however, 
move past the examination of road signs and develop more systemati-
cally the content of justice goals and the constraints these goals pose 
73. Schroeder, supra note 69, at 516. 
April-May 1987] Road Signs and Justice Goals 1323 
for both efficiency and distribution. If he can be encouraged to do so, 
Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law will become a stepping stone in 
the most important single individual effort to describe the role of eco-
nomic analysis in tort law, and indeed in the general legal order. 
